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Abstract. Nowadays, most companies need to collect, store, and man-
age personal information in order to deliver their services. Accordingly,
privacy has emerged as a key concern for these companies since they need
to comply with privacy laws and regulations. To deal with them prop-
erly, such privacy concerns should be considered since the early phases
of system design. Ontologies have proven to be a key factor for elaborat-
ing high-quality requirements models. However, most existing work deals
with privacy as a special case of security requirements, thereby missing
essential traits of this family of requirements. In this paper, we intro-
duce COPri, a Core Ontology for Privacy requirements engineering that
adopts and extends our previous work on privacy requirements engineer-
ing ontology that has been mined through a systematic literature review.
Additionally, we implement, validate and then evaluate our ontology.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, most companies collect, store, and manage personal information (e.g.,
information about customers, citizens, etc.) to deliver their services. These com-
panies need to protect the privacy of personal information not only for maintain-
ing their credibility and repetition but also to comply with various privacy laws
and regulations [36]. More specifically, most developed countries have developed
various laws and regulations to govern the use of personal information. For in-
stance, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [30] has been recently
developed by the European Union (EU) with the aim to safeguard the use of
personal information among all EU member states. Moreover, the Australia Gov-
ernment issued the Privacy Act 1988 [68], which include a set of privacy rights
known as the Information Privacy Principles (IPPs). Canada has developed the
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) [64]
that regulates how personal information can be collected, used and disclosed. In
the United States, more domain-specific laws have been developed (e.g., HIPAA
[23] for healthcare domain, the Financial Services Modernization Act [24], etc.)
Failing to comply with privacy laws and regulations results in huge monetary
sanctions, which companies want to avoid [34]. Accordingly, privacy has become
a main concern for system designers. In other words, dealing with privacy-related
concerns is a must these days because privacy breaches may have severe con-
sequences [29,47]. In particular, the absence of appropriate privacy protection
mechanisms may lead to privacy breaches, which impose huge direct cost [1,29],
as well as long-term consequences [8,10] such as having one’s personal informa-
tion in the wrong hands [60]. However, most of these breaches can be avoided
if the privacy requirements of the system-to-be were captured properly during
system design (e.g., Privacy by Design (PbD)) [52,57]. Nevertheless, most exist-
ing work on privacy requirements often deal with them either as non-functional
requirements (NFRs) with no specific techniques on how such requirements can
be met [65], or as security requirements (e.g., [106,52]), i.e., focusing mainly on
confidentiality and overlooking important privacy aspects such as anonymity,
pseudonymity, unlinkability, unobservability, etc.
On the other hand, privacy is one of the few concepts that has been studied
across many discipline including law [101], sociology [102,22], psychology [2], and
information systems [13]. Although it has been studied for more than a century,
it is still elusive and vague concept to grasp [86,87,52]. Despite this, numerous
attempts have been made by scholars to clarify the concept by linking it to
more refined concepts such as secrecy, confidentiality, anonymity, pseudonymity,
unlinkability, unobservability, control of personal information [87,108,71], or to
solitude, intimacy, anonymity, and reserve as in [102]. Other studies suggest that
the notion of risk is also related to privacy as the loss of information control im-
plies risk [72,84,56]. While Awad and Krishnan [4] investigated how transparency
can influence privacy. However, there is no consensus on the definition of these
concepts or which of them should be used to analyze privacy [87].
In addition, many of these concepts are overlapping, which contributes to the
confusion while dealing with privacy [15]. This has resulted in much confusion
among designers and stakeholders, and has led in turn to wrong design deci-
sions. Ontologies have proven to be a key success factor for eliciting high-quality
requirements, as they reduce the conceptual vagueness and terminological con-
fusion by providing a shared understanding of the related concepts between the
designers and stakeholders of the system [96,51,18,88]. In this context, a well-
defined ontology that captures key privacy-related concepts and relationships
could solve this problem.
Privacy is a social concept [60,34]. Accordingly, the privacy ontology should
conceptualize privacy requirements in their social and organizational context
[34]. In other words, the ontology should consider not only the technical aspects
of privacy but also its related social and organizational aspects. Since most
systems these days are socio-technical systems consisting not only of technical
components but also of humans along with their interrelationships, where differ-
ent kinds of vulnerabilities might manifest themselves [59,36]. More specifically,
focusing on the technical aspects and leaving the social and organizational as-
pects outside the system’s boundary leaves the system open to different kinds of
vulnerabilities that might manifest themselves in the social interactions and/or
the organizational structure of the system.
In previous research [34], we worked toward addressing this problem by
proposing an ontology for privacy requirements that has been mined through
a systematic literature review. In this paper, we extend the ontology proposed
in [34] with new and more refined concepts concerning both personal informa-
tion and privacy requirements. Moreover, we implement the ontology, apply it
to an Ambient-Assisted Living (AAL) illustrating example, and then validate
it by querying the ontology instance (e.g., the AAL example) depending on a
set of competency questions. Finally, we evaluate the ontology against common
pitfalls in ontologies with the help of some tools, lexical semantics experts, and
privacy and security researchers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section (§2) presents the AAL
example that is used to illustrate our work, and we describe the process we
followed for developing the COPri ontology in Section (§3). Section (§4) describes
the conceptual model of COPri, and we implement and validate the ontology in
Section (§5) and (§6) respectively. We evaluate the ontology in Section (§7), and
we discuss threats to its validity in Section (§8). Related work is presented in
Section (§9), and we conclude and discuss the future work in Section (§10).
2 Illustrating example: the Ambient-Assisted Living
(AAL) System
Longevity among the elderly has result in many challenges for society and
the health care system as well, such as increasing in age-related diseases (e.g.,
Alzheimer, diabetes, etc.), which in turn leads to a shortage of caregivers [79].
But this is not the only problem since most older people (around 89%) prefer to
stay at their own homes [107,79], and given the costs of home care nursing, it is
imperative to develop technologies that help older people to age in place [107].
AAL systems sound to be an appropriate solution to this problem. AAL
systems rely on monitoring and actuating devices to shift some of the healthcare
services from a hospital-centered to a patient-centric treatment [83]. In other
words, instead of being measured face-to-face, a patient’s health status can be
sensed remotely, continuously, and in real time, and then such information is
processed and transferred to a hospital or health care center [44]. Moreover,
AAL technologies facilitate communication among physicians and patients, and
allows for discussing medical data and negotiating treatment procedure remotely
[6]. This decrease both the costs of health care services and also the workload
of medical practitioners [105,63,107]. However, numerous studies showed that
privacy is one of the most highlighted criticisms for such technology [46].
Our motivating example concerns an old person called Jack that suffers from
diabetes disease. Jack lives in a home that is equipped with AAL system, which
Fig. 1: Simplified representation of the AAL system
provides an appropriate environment for Jack to live normally. In particular, the
AAL system depends on various interconnected body sensors (e.g., electroen-
cephalography (ECG), electromyography (EMG), Continuous Glucose Monitor-
ing (CGM), location, and motion sensors) that collect various information con-
cerning Jack’s vital signs, location, and activities. This information is transmit-
ted to Jack’s Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) that assesses his health situation
and provide required notification accordingly.
Jack’ PDA also forward the information to a nearby caring center, where a
virtual nurse called Sarah can monitor such information, and she can also mon-
itor some of Jack’s activities (e.g., watching tv, sleeping, preparing or having
a meal, etc.) by collecting location and motion activities. Sarah can detect un-
usual situations and react accordingly, she also has access to all Jack’s health
records and she may contact the required medical professional (e.g., General
Practitioner (GP), consulting physicians) that might be needed depending on
Jack’s situation. Jack, like many other users, wants to preserve his privacy by
controlling what is collected and shared of his personal information, who is using
such information, and for which reasons.
Figure 1 shows a simplified representation of the AAL system that Jack
depends on, which adopts a three-tier Body Area Network (BAN) communi-
cation architecture [66]. Such architecture classifies the BAN communications
into three types: 1- intra-BAN that has a range of about two meters around
the human body and covers communications between body sensors (e.g., ECG,
EMG, CGM, and motion sensor) and PDA; 2- inter-BAN covers communica-
tions between a PDA and one or more access points (APs); and 3- beyond-BAN
connects the APs to the internet and other networks. This architecture helps in
better understanding and dealing with privacy requirements/concerns.
3 The process for developing the COPri ontology
The process for developing COPri has been developed based on [37,95,25] fol-
lowing the five principles proposed by Gruber [40] (e.g., clarity, coherence, ex-
tendibility, minimal encoding bias, and minimal ontological commitment). The
process is depicted in Figure 2, and it is composed of five main steps:
– Step 1. scope & objective identification aims at identifying the scope of the
ontology, the purposes it will be used for, and its intended users [95,25]. As
previously highlighted, there is a need for addressing privacy concerns dur-
ing the system design (e.g., Privacy by Design (PbD) [52,57]). Nevertheless,
based on the results of our systematic literature review [34], most existing
studies miss several key privacy concepts and relationships. Therefore, it is
almost impossible to address main privacy concerns during the system de-
sign. To this end, COPri aims at assisting software engineers while designing
privacy-aware systems that belong to various domains by providing a generic
and expressive set of key privacy concepts and relationships, which enable
for capturing privacy requirements of the system-to-be in their social and
organizational context.
– Step 2. Knowledge acquisition aims at identifying and collecting knowledge
needed for the construction of the ontology. We have conducted a systematic
literature review with a main purpose of identifying the key concepts and
relationships for capturing privacy requirements3. In particular, five elec-
tronic database sources have been used for the acquisition of knowledge. 240
relevant papers have been returned, among which we have selected 34 after
removing duplicated papers and applying several selections and quality as-
sessment criteria. Then, we have analyzed the contents of selected studies
identifying 38 privacy related concepts and relationships4, which have been
grouped into four main groups based on their type: 17 organizational con-
cepts capture social and technical aspects of the system-to-be; 9 concepts to
capture risks that might endanger privacy requirements; 5 treatment con-
cepts capture countermeasure techniques to mitigate risks to privacy needs;
and 7 privacy concepts capture the stakeholders privacy requirements/needs.
– Step 3. Conceptualization aims at structuring the acquired knowledge into
a conceptual model that captures the key concepts of the ontology along
with their interrelationships [25]. In [34], we have built an ontology based on
the 38 selected key concepts and relationships. In his paper, we extend this
ontology with more refined concepts concerning both personal information
and privacy requirements. Additionally, we conducted a survey to collect
feedback from privacy and security researchers to evaluate the completeness
of our proposed ontology, i.e., determine whether the selected concepts and
relationships are capable of properly dealing with privacy requirements or
they need to be extended or refined. The feedback confirmed that most of
3 A detailed version of the systematic literature review can be found at [33]
4 In the case of multiple synonyms, some were omitted
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Fig. 2: The process for developing the COPri ontology
the concepts and relationships are appropriate and the ontology is capa-
ble of capturing privacy requirements. Some feedback suggested to refine,
include or exclude some concepts/relationships, we took these suggestions
into account while developing the final ontology. A detailed description of
the resulting ontology (COPri) is provided in the next section.
– Step 4. Implementation aims at codifying the ontology in a formal language.
This requires an environment that guarantees the absence of lexical and
syntactic errors from the ontology; translators, to guarantee the portability
of the definitions into other target languages; and an automated reasoner
to detect incompleteness, inconsistencies and redundant knowledge [94]. Al-
though there exist several environments for developing (codifying) ontologies
(NeOn Toolkit [43], OntoEdit [91], SWOOP [53], prote´ge´ [76]). We have cho-
sen Prote´ge´5 that is a set of open-source and domain-independent ontology
design software developed in Stanford Medical Informatics. Prote´ge´ can be
used easily for creating, modifying, visualizing and checking the consistency
of ontology. Moreover, the reasoner can be used to automatically compute a
classification hierarchy (inferred hierarchy) based on a manually constructed
class hierarchy that is called the asserted hierarchy. In addition, prote´ge´ of-
fers several useful plug-ins for visualizing ontology, and most importantly it
offers a plug-in for using SPARQL (Protocol and RDF Query Language) to
extract knowledge from ontology through defined queries and rules [77]. The
implementation of COPri is discussed in section 5.
– Step 5. Validation, aims at ensuring that the resulting ontology meets the
needs of its usage, i.e., the ontology corresponds to the system, which it
is supposed to represent [25]. According to [95], informal and formal ques-
tions/queries can be used to validate ontology. Following [26,16], we vali-
dated COPri after applying it to the AAL illustrating example by querying
the ontology instances depending on Competency Questions (CQs), and then
verifying the correctness of the results of such queries. More specifically, the
CQs are used to evaluate whether the ontology captures enough detailed
information about the targeted domain to fulfill the needs of its intended
use. The validation of COPri is discussed in more details in section 6.
5 http://protege.stanford.edu/
4 The conceptual model of COPri
In this section, we present the conceptual model of COPri in terms of its concepts
and relationships. Figure 3 shows the meta-model of COPri as a UML class
diagram. The concepts of COPri are organized into four main dimensions:
Organizational dimension: proposes concepts to capture the social and tech-
nical components of the system in terms of their capabilities, objectives, and
dependencies.
Risk dimension: proposes concepts to capture risks that might endanger pri-
vacy needs at the social and organizational levels.
Treatment dimension: proposes concepts to capture countermeasure tech-
niques to mitigate risks to privacy needs.
Privacy dimension: proposes concepts to capture the stakeholders’ (actors)
privacy requirements/needs concerning their personal information.
(1) Organizational dimension, includes concepts for capturing the organi-
zational aspects of the system, which are further organized into several categories
such as agentive, intentional and informational entities, social dependencies and
social trust. In what follows, we define each of these categories in terms of their
concepts and relationships.
Agentive entities: captures the active entities of the system, we have three
concepts along with two relationships:
Actor represents an autonomous entity that has intentionality and strategic
goals within the system, and it covers two entities: a role and an agent:
Role represents an abstract characterization of an actor in terms of a set
of behaviors and functionalities within some specialized context. A role
can be a specialization (is a relationship) of one another.
Agent represents an autonomous entity that has a specific manifestation in
the system. An agent can plays a role or more within the system, where
an agent inherits the properties of the roles it plays.
Intentional entities: captures the objectives that the actors aim to achieve.
Therefore, we adopted the goal concept as well as and/or decomposition (refine-
ment) relationships to represent such objectives.
A goal is a state of affairs that an actor aims to achieve. When a goal is too
coarse to be achieved, it can be refined through and/or-decompositions of a
root goal into finer sub-goals.
and-decomposition implies that the achievement of the root-goal requires the
achievement of all of its sub-goals.
or-decomposition is used to provide different alternatives to achieve the root
goal, and it implies that the achievement of the root-goal requires the
achievement of any of its sub-goals.
Informational entities: capture the Information related concepts and re-
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Information represents a statement provided or learned about something or
someone. Information can be atomic or composite (composed of several
parts), and we rely on partOf relationship to capture the relationship be-
tween an information entity and its sub-parts. Moreover, we differentiate
between two types of information:
Public information, any information that cannot be related (directly or
indirectly) to an identified or identifiable legal entity.
Personal information, any information that can be related (directly or
indirectly) to an identified or identifiable legal entity (e.g., names, ad-
dresses, medical records) [7,97].
Several researchers have advocated that not all personal information has the
same sensitivity levels (e.g., [97,17,57]). Moreover, various sensitivity levels and
categories for personal information have been proposed (e.g., [12,21,93,55]). To
this end, we include sensitivity level concept that personal information has in
our ontology. Based on [93], we adopt four different sensitivity levels ordered
as (R)estricted, (C)onfidential, (S)ensitive, and Secre(T), where Secre(T) is the
most sensitive. Personal information with different sensitivity levels may have
different privacy requirements, i.e., sensitivity levels can be used to facilitate the
identification of privacy requirements.
On the other hand, numerous works (e.g., [67,5,70]) have linked the sensi-
tivity of personal information to when and where such information has been
collected and for what purposes, i.e., the context/state of affairs related to such
information. Thus, we adopt the concept of situation as a mean to determine the
sensitivity level of personal information, where a situation can be defined as a
partial state of affairs in terms of things that exist in that state, their properties,
and interrelations [48].
Use is a relationship between a goal and information, and it has three at-
tributes:
Type of Use (ToU), our ontology provide four different types of use:
Produce indicates that information is created by a goal;
Read indicates that information is consumed by a goal;
Modify indicates that information is modified/altered by a goal;
Collect indicates that information is acquired by a goal.
Need to Use (NtU) captures the necessary of use, and we differentiate be-
tween two main types:
Require indicates that the use of information is required for the goal
achievement [32];
Optional indicates that information is not required for the goal achieve-
ment [32].
Purpose of Use (PoU), we differentiate between two main categories of pur-
poses of use:
Compatible indicates that the purpose for which information is used is
compliant with the rules that guarantee the best interest of its owner;
Incompatible indicates that the purpose for which information is used is
not compliant with the rules that guarantee the best interest of its owner.
Describes is a relationship where information characterizes a goal (activity)
while it is being pursued by some actor.
Information ownership & Permissions: capture the relationships
among personal information, the legal entities who own them, and how such
entities control the use of such information by others.
Own indicates that an actor is the legitimate owner of information, where in-
formation owner has full control over the use of information it owns.
Permission is consent that identifies a particular use of a particular information
in a system [82]. Information owner (data subject6) controls the use of its
own information depending on permissions over such information. In COPri,
a permission has a type that is (P)roduce, (R)ead, (M)odify and (C)ollect,
which cover the four relationships between goals and information that our
ontology proposes.
Entities interactions: capture the interactions/dependencies among actors
of the system concerning their objectives and entitlements. The ontology adopts
three types of interactions:
Information provision captures the transmission of information (provi-
sionOf ) by an actor (provisionBy) to another one (provisionTo), where the
source of the provision relationship is the provider and the destination is the
requester. Moreover, information provision has a type that can be either con-
fidential or nonConfidential, where the former guarantee the confidentiality
of the transmitted information, while the last does not.
Delegation indicates that actors can delegate obligations and entitlements to
one another, where the source of delegation called the delegator, the desti-
nation is called delegatee, and the subject of delegation is called delegatum.
The concept of delegation is further specialized into two concepts: Goal dele-
gation, where the delegatum is a goal; and Permission delegation, where the
delegatum is a permission.
Adoption is considered as a key component of social commitment, and it indi-
cates that an actor accepts to take responsibility for the delegated objectives
and/ or entitlements from another actor [9].
Entities social trust: the need for trust arises when actors depend on one
another for goals or permissions since such dependencies might entail risk [11,31].
Therefore, our ontology adopts the concept of trust to capture the actors’ expec-
tations of one another concerning their delegations. The source of trust called
the trustor, the destination is called trustee, and the subject of trust is called
trustum. Trust has a type that can be either:
6 Information owner and data subject are synonyms in this paper
Trust means the trustor expect that the trustee will behave as expected con-
sidering the trustum (e.g., a trustee will achieve the delegated goal, or it will
not misuse the delegated permission).
Distrust means the trustor expect that the trustee will not behave as expected
considering the trustum (e.g., a trustee will not achieve the delegated goal,
or it will misuse the delegated permission).
The concept of Trust is further specialized into two concepts GoalTrust,
where the trustum is a goal; and PermissionTrust, where the trustum is a per-
mission.
Monitoring: can be defined as the process of observing and analyzing the
performance of an actor in order to detect any undesirable performance [42]. We
adopt the concept of monitoring to compensate the lack of trust or distrust in
the trustee concerning the trustum [27,106], where the source of monitoring is
called the monitor, the destination is called monitoree.
The concept of monitor is further specialized into two concepts GoalMonitor,
where the subject of the monitoring is a goal; and PermissionMonitor, where
the subject of the monitoring is a permission.
(2) Risk dimension, includes risk related concepts along with their in-
terrelationships (e.g., threat, vulnerabilities, attack, etc.) concerning personal
information. In what follows, we define each of these concepts and their interre-
lationships:
A vulnerability is a weakness in the system that can be exploited by a threat
[80,62,85].
A threat is a potential incident that threaten personal information by exploit-
ing a vulnerability concerning such information [62,85,54]. A threat can be
either natural (e.g. disaster), accidental (e.g. hardware or software failure), or
intentional (e.g. theft of personal information) [98,88]. COPri differentiates
between two types of threat:
Incidental threat is a casual, natural or accidental threat that is not caused by
a threat actor nor require an attack method. Incidental threat has a probability
that measures the likelihood of its occurs, and it is is characterized by three
different values high, medium or low.
Intentional threat is a threat that require a threat actor and includes a pre-
sumed attack method [58,61].
Threat actor is an actor that intends to achieve an intentional threat
[80,62,19].
Attack method is a standard means by which a threat actor carries out an
intentional threat [62,20,88].
Impact is the consequence of the threat over the personal information. An im-
pact has a Severity that captures the level of the impact [100,88], which is
characterized by high, medium or low.
(3) Treatment dimension, includes countermeasure concepts to mitigate
risks. COPri proposes a high abstraction level concepts to capture the required
protection/treatment level (e.g., privacy goal), which can be refined into con-
crete protection/treatment constraints (e.g., mechanisms or policies) that can
be implemented. The concepts of the treatment dimension are:
A privacy goal defines an aim to counter threats and prevents harm to per-
sonal information by satisfying privacy criteria concerning such information.
A privacy constraint is a design restriction that is used to realize/satisfy a
privacy goal, constraints can be either a privacy policy or privacy mechanism.
A privacy policy is a privacy statement that defines the permitted and/or for-
bidden actions to be carried out by actors of the system toward information.
A privacy mechanism is a concrete technique to be implemented for helping
towards the satisfaction of privacy goal. Some mechanisms can be directly
applied to personal information (e.g., anonymity, unlinkability).
(4) Privacy dimension, introduce concepts to capture the actors’ privacy
requirements/needs concerning their personal information. The concepts of the
privacy dimension are:
Privacy requirement that is used to capture information owners’ privacy
needs at a high abstraction level concerning their personal information. Pri-
vacy requirements are interpretedBy privacy goals. Moreover, privacy require-
ment is further specialized into seven more refined concepts:
Confidentiality means personal information should be kept secure from any
potential leaks and improper access [87,17,57]. We rely on the following prin-
ciples to analyze confidentiality:
Non-disclosure, personal information can only be disclosed if the owner’s
consent is provided, i.e., the disclosure of the personal information should
be under the control of its legitimate owner [87,17,7,57].
Note that non-disclosure also covers information provision (e.g., con-
fidential information provision). Therefore, non-disclosure can be ana-
lyzed depending on the existence of read permission as well as the con-
fidentiality of information provision.
Need to Know (NtK), personal information can only be used if it is
strictly necessary for completing a certain task [57]. NtK can be ana-
lyzed depending on Need to Use (NtU) that captures the necessary of
use, i.e., if the type of NtU is optional (i.e., not required) a violation can
be raised.
Purpose of Use (PoU), personal information can only be used for spe-
cific, explicit, legitimate purposes and not further used in a way that
is incompatible with those purposes [97,87,17]. PoU can be analyzed
depending on the type of PoU, if it is incompatible a violation can be
raised.
Anonymity, the identity of information owner should not be disclosed unless
it is strictly required [17,87,50,71], i.e., the primary/secondary identifiers of
the data subject (e.g., name, social security number, address, etc.) should
be removed if they are not strictly required and information still can be
used for the same purpose after their removal. Personal information can be
anonymized depending on some privacy mechanism.
Unlinkability means that it should not be possible to link personal information
back to its owner. In other words, any identifiers that allow for such linkage
should be removed [50,65,52,71]. A privacy mechanism can be used to remove
any linkage between personal information and its owner.
Unobservability, the identity of information owner should not be observed by
others, especially third parties, while performing an activity (e.g., pursuing
a goal) [50,52,71]. Unlike Anonymity and Unlinkability that try to hide the
identity of information owner, Unobservability aims to hide some activities
that are performed by the information owner [71].
Unobservability can be analyzed relying on the describes relationship, which
enables for detecting situations where personal information that describes an
activity (goal) being pursued by a data subject is being collected by some
other actor [35].
Notice, information owner should be notified when its information is being
collected [97,87,17]. Notice is considered mainly to address situations where
personal information related to a legitimate entity is being collected without
her knowledge. Notice can be analyzed depending on the collect relationship
and its corresponding permission.
In case, personal information is being collected and there is no permission
to collect, a notice violation will be raised. Providing a permission to col-
lect means that the actor has been already notified and agrees his personal
information to be collected.
Transparency, information owner should be able to know who is using his/her
information and for what purposes [97,17,54]. We rely on two principles to
analyze transparency:
Authentication a mechanism aims at verifying whether actors are who
they claim they are. Authentication can be analyzed by verifying whether
1- the actor is playing a role that enables to identify its main responsi-
bilities; and 2- the actor is not playing any threat actor role. If both of
these rules did not hold, a violation can be raised.
Authorization a mechanism aims at verifying whether actors can use in-
formation in accordance with their credentials [17]. Authorization can
be analyzed by verifying whether the actor has the required permissions
to perform a task at hand.
Accountability, information owner should have a mechanism available to them
to hold information users accountable for their actions concerning informa-
tion [17,54]. We rely on the non-repudiation principle to analyze account-
ability:
Non-repudiation, the delegatee cannot repudiate he/she accepted the del-
egation [54]. Non-repudiation can be analyzed relying on the adoption
concept [9], if there exists a delegatee without an adopt relationship to
the delegatum, a non-repudiation violation can be raised.
5 The implementation of COPri
This section describes how we have implemented (codified) the COPri ontol-
ogy depending on Prote´ge´ software7. In Prote´ge´, ontology consists of Classes,
Properties, and Individuals. Classes are concrete representation of concepts, and
they can be interpreted as sets that contain Individuals (also known as instances
of classes). In other words, classes are used to specify conditions that must be
satisfied by individuals to be a member of such classes, where all Classes are
subclasses of the class Thing. While Properties are binary relationships among
Classes/Individuals.
We have implemented the conceptual model of COPri relying on classes and
object properties in Prote´ge´, and we have to modify and create new classes
and relationships during this process. We have also created new classes and
subclasses to represent attributes of some classes, since classes in Prote´ge´ cannot
have attributes. Moreover, for each class that has attributes with quantitative
values, we have created a class (called a Value Partition pattern) to present each
of these attributes, and several individuals to cover all quantitative values of
each of the attributes.
For example, the class Sensitivity that has Sensitivity level attribute, which
can have the following valuesSecret, Sensitive, Confidential or Restricted has
been represented by a class named Sensitivity level that has four defined indi-
viduals slSecret, slSensitive, slConfidential or slRestricted. Furthermore, we have
defined the hasSensitive property to link the PersonalInformation class to the
Sensitivity level class.
Classes may overlap and to ensure that an individual that belongs to one of
the classes cannot be a member of any other class, such classes must be made
disjoint from one another. Thus, all primitive siblings classes (e.g., PersonalInfor-
mation and PublicInformation) in our ontology have been made disjoint. This
helps the reasoner to check the logical consistency of the ontology. Moreover,
we have used Probe Classes [49], which are classes that are subclasses of two
or more disjoint classes to test and ensure that the ontology does not include
inconsistencies.
Additionally, we have used a covering axiom to solve the open world assump-
tion in OWL-based ontologies, where a covering axiom is a class that results from
the union of the classes being covered. In other words, a covering axiom means
that any member of the covered class must be a member of the classes being
covered. For example, PersonalInformation and PublicInformation are the only
subclasses of the Information class, and using a covering axiom here means that
Information must be one of these two subclasses, i.e., Information is covered by
PersonalInformation and PublicInformation.
A restriction in Prote´ge´ can be used to describe a class of individuals based
on the relationships that members of the class participate in. In other words,
the class contains all of the individuals that satisfy the defined restriction. Re-
strictions can be categorized into existential and universal restrictions:
7 http://protege.stanford.edu/
Existential restrictions (also known as some restrictions (someValuesFrom)
and denoted by ∃) describe classes of individuals that participate in at least
one relationship along a specified property to individuals that are members
of a specified class [49].
Universal restrictions (also known as all restrictions (allValuesFrom) and de-
noted ∀) describe classes of individuals that for a given property only have
relationships along this property to individuals that are members of a spec-
ified class [49].
By relying on Existential restrictions, we could say that a class is a subclass
of other class if some property (relationship) holds. For example, PersonalIn-
formation is a subclass of the Information class if some related property to the
Actor class exist. This is called necessary conditions and it means if something
is a member of this class then it is necessary to fulfill these conditions. How-
ever, with necessary conditions, we cannot say that, if something fulfills these
conditions then it must be a member of this class.
This problem can be solved by relying on sufficient conditions that use uni-
versal restrictions, which means if something fulfills the defined conditions then
it must be a member of this class. In this context, sufficient conditions enable
us to say that if something is a member of the class PersonalInformation it is
necessary for it to be a kind of Information, and it is necessary for it to only
have a property of type related to the Actor class.
Using only sufficient conditions, the class PersonalInformation may also con-
tains individuals that are Information and do not participate in any property of
type related to the Actor class because universal restrictions do not specify the
existence of a relationship. They merely state that if a relationship exists for the
property then it must be to individuals that are members of a specific class.
This problem can be solved by using both of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions, which enables to say, if something is a member of the class PersonalInfor-
mation, then it is necessary for it to be a kind of Information, and it is necessary
for it to have a property of type related to the Actor class. In other words, us-
ing both of the necessary and sufficient conditions is sufficient to recognize all
classes that must be a member of the class PersonalInformation.
On the other hand, properties are used to link individuals from a domain
to individuals from a range. Thus, we have defined the domain and range for
each object property in our ontology (shown in Table 1), which can be used by a
reasoner to make inferences and detect inconsistencies. For example, the domain
of property (relationship) aims is the class Actor and its range is the class Goal.
Moreover, we used only one inverse property (e.g., related property between
PersonalInformation and actor classes) in our ontology to minimize the number
of properties and because most of such properties can be inferred. Finally, we
have used cardinality restrictions to specify the number of relationships between
classes depending on at least, at most or exactly keywords.
Table 1: Description of the domain and range of object properties
Object property Domain Range Object property Domain Range
adopts Actor Delegation aims Actor Goal
andDecomposed Goal Goal appliedTo Pri.Mechanism Per.Information
concerning Pri.Requirement Per.Information delegatee Delegation Actor
delegator Actor Delegation describes Per.Information Goal
determines Situation SensitivityLevel exploits Threat Vulnerability
goalDelegatum goalDelegation Goal goalTrustum Trust Goal
hasDelegationType Delegation DelegationType hasImpact Threat Impact
hasNeedtoUseType Use NeedtoUseType hasPermission Actor Permission
hasPermissionType Permission PermissionType hasProbability Inc.Threat Probability
hasProvisionType Provision ProvisionType hasPoUType Use PoUType
hasSensitivity Per.Information SensitivityLevel hasSeverityLevel Impact SeverityLevel
hasTrustLevel Trust TrustLevel hasTypeOfUse Use TypeOfUse
impactOver Impact Per.Information includes Int.Threat AttackMethod
intends Actor Int.Threat interpretedBy Pri.Requirement PrivacyGoal
is a Role Role isSubjectTo Per.Information Vulnerability
mitigates PrivacyGoal Vulnerability monitor Actor Monitor
monitoree Monitor Actor ofGoal goalMonitor Goal
ofPermission perm.Monitor permission orDecomposed Goal Goal
over Permission Per.Information own Actor Per.Information
partOf Information Information perm.Delegatum perm.Delegation PermissionType
perm.Trustum Trust Permission plays Agent Role
provideTo Provision Actor provideBy Actor Provision
provisionOf Provision Information realizedBy PrivacyGoal Pri.Constraint
related Per.Information Actor threaten Threat Per.Information
trustee Trust Actor trustor Actor Trust
usedBy Goal Use usedOf Use Information
A snapshot of the COPri ontology is shown in Figure 4, and the COPri
ontology is available in OWL formal at https://goo.gl/AaqUxx.
Fig. 4: A snapshot of the COPri ontology using OntoGraf plug-in
6 The validation of COPri
In this section, we discuss how we validated our ontology depending on Com-
petency Questions (CQs) that the ontology should be able to answer, i.e., to
evaluate whether the ontology is able to capture detailed information about the
targeted domain to fulfill the needs of its intended use [25]. In other words, CQs
represent a set of questions that the ontology must be capable of answering to
be considered competent for tackling the problem it has been developed to solve
[26,95,16]. In particular, we applied the COPri ontology to the AAL illustrating
example, and then we validated COPri by formulating a set of CQs to query
the ontology instances and check whether these queries are able to return reli-
able answers. Figure 5 shows a partial diagram of the AAL illustrating example
represented in an extended goal model language8.
The CQs are meant to assist and guide requirements engineers while dealing
with privacy requirements in their social and organizational context by returning
useful knowledge concerning the ontology. Moreover, some CQs have been devel-
oped to assist designers capturing (detecting and reporting) wrong/bad design
decisions related to the four dimensions of our ontology, namely organizational,
risk, treatment, and most importantly privacy requirements (e.g., confidentiality
violation, notice violation, etc.).
The formulation of the CQs was an iterative process and aimed at covering
main wrong/bad design decisions that we call violations. Therefore, several CQs
have been refined and extended before having the final set of CQs. Note that the
concepts and relationships of the ontology have been refined and extended as well
when we were formulating the CQs because some limitations and inadequacies in
the ontology have been revealed. The set of CQs9 is shown in Table 2, where each
CQ is represented both informally (natural language) and formally (SPARQL
query). In what follows, we describe each of these four groups of CQs:
CQ1-3 are used to query organizational related aspects, where CQ1 can
be used to capture situations where a permission is delegated without a trust
or trust compensation (e.g., monitoring). With the absence of trust and moni-
toring relationships, the delegator cannot guarantee that the delegatee will not
misuse the delegated permission. For example, if there was no trust nor moni-
toring between Jack and Sarah concerning the delegation of read and/or collect
permissions of Jack’s location (shown in Figure 5), CQ1 will detect and report
such situation.
CQ2 can be used to capture situations, where an actor monitors a dele-
gation of permission although he/she trusts the delegatee, i.e., both trust and
monitoring are used concerning the delegation of permission. In such situation,
monitoring is not required and it is considered a bad design decision. Concerning
the previous example, if there is also a monitoring concerning the delegation of
8 Note that this modeling language has not been developed yet, the diagram has been
developed to assist the reader better understanding the usefulness of CQs
9 Note that the main focus of the CQs is privacy requirements, not goal analysis
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Fig. 5: A partial goal model concerning the AAL illustrating example
read/collect between Jack and Sarah, CQ2 will detect such situation and report
that the monitoring relationship is not required.
CQ3 can be used to return different sets of personal information based on
their sensitivity levels (e.g., Secret, Sensitive, Confidential or Restricted).
Table 2: Competency Questions for validating the COPri ontology
Organizational dimension
CQ1. Who are the delegators that delegate produce, read, modify, or collect
permission, which is not accompanied by trust nor monitoring?
SELECT ?actor1
WHERE {?actor1 copri:delegator ?delegate.
?delegate copri:permissionDelegatum copri:permProduce.
[:permRead | :permModify | :permCollect]
?delegate copri:delegatee ?actor2.
FILTER NOT EXISTS { ?actor1 copri:trustor ?trust.
?trust copri:trustee ?actor2.
?trust copri:hasTrustLevel copri:trust.
?trust copri:permissionTrustum ?perm.
?perm copri:hasPermissionType copri:permProduce.
[:permRead | :permModify | :permCollect]}
FILTER NOT EXISTS {?actor1 copri:monitor ?monitor.
?monitor copri:monitoree ?actor2.
?monitor copri:ofPermission ?perm.}}
CQ2. Who are the delegators that delegate produce, read, modify, or collect
permission accompanied by both trust and monitoring?
SELECT ?actor1
WHERE {?actor1 copri:delegator ?delegate.
?delegate copri:permissionDelegatum copri:permProduce.
[:permRead | :permModify | :permCollect]
?delegate copri:delegatee ?actor2.
?actor1 copri:trustor ?trust.
?trust copri:trustee ?actor2.
?trust copri:hasTrustLevel copri:trust.
?trust copri:permissionTrustum ?perm.
?perm copri:hasPermissionType copri:permProduce.
[:permRead | :permModify | :permCollect]
?actor1 copri:monitor ?monitor.
?monitor copri:monitoree ?actor2.
?monitor copri:ofPermission ?perm.}
CQ3. Which are the personal information of sensitivity Restricted [Confiden-
tial, Sensitive or Secret]?
SELECT ?PerInfo
WHERE {?PerInfo copri:hasSensitivityLevel copri:slRestricted
[:slConfidential | :slSensitive | :slSecret]}
Risk dimension
CQ4. Which are the existing vulnerabilities and which personal information
are subject to them?
SELECT ?Vulnerability ?PerInfo
WHERE {?Vulnerability copri:isSubjectTo ?PerInfo}
CQ5. Which are the existing vulnerabilities and which are the threats that can
exploit them?
SELECT ?Threat ?Vulnerability
WHERE {?Threat copri:exploits ?Vulnerability}
CQ6. Which are the existing vulnerabilities that are not mitigated by privacy
goals?
SELECT ?Vulnerability
WHERE {?Threat copri:exploits ?Vulnerability.
FILTER NOT EXISTS {?PriGoal copri:mitigates ?Vulnerability.}
CQ7. Which are the existing threats and which are the personal information
that are threatened by them?
SELECT ?Threat ?PerInfo
WHERE {?Threat copri:threaten ?PerInfo}
CQ8. Which are the existing threats that have an impact with severity level
Low [Medium, High] over personal information?
SELECT ?Threat
WHERE {?Threat copri:hasImpact copri:SevLlowSeverity
[:SevLmediumSeverity | :SevLhighSeverity]}
CQ9. Which are the existing intentional threats and which are the personal
information that are threatened by them?
SELECT ?Threat ?PerInfo
WHERE {?Threat copri:threaten ?PerInfo.
?Threat copri:includes ?AttackMeth}
CQ10.Who are the threat actors and which are the intentional threats that
they intend for?
SELECT ?ThrActor ?Threat
WHERE {?ThrActor copri:intends ?Threat}
CQ11.Which are the existing attack methods and to which intentional threats
they can be used for?
SELECT ?AttackMeth ?Threat
WHERE {?Threat copri:includes ?AttackMeth}
CQ12.Which are the existing incidental threats and which are the personal
information that are threatened by them?
SELECT ?Threat ?PerInfo
WHERE {?Threat copri:threaten ?PerInfo.
?Threat copri:hasProbability ?ProbLevel}
CQ13.Which are the existing incidental threats of probability Low [Medium |
High]?
SELECT ?Threat
WHERE {?Threat copri:hasProbability copri:pllow
[:plmedium | :plhigh]}
Treatment dimension
CQ14.Which are the privacy goals that are realized by privacy constraints?
SELECT ?PriGoal
WHERE {?PriGoal copri:realizedBy ?PriCon}
CQ15.Which are the existing privacy mechanisms and which are the personal
information that such mechanisms are applied to?
SELECT ?PriMech ?PerInfo
WHERE {?PriMech copri:appliedTo ?PerInfo}
Privacy dimension
CQ16.Which is the personal information that is read without read permission?
SELECT ?PerInfo
WHERE {?PerInfo copri:related ?actor1.
?PerInfo copri:describes ?goal1.
?use copri:useOf ?PerInfo.
?goal2 copri:useBy ?use.
?use copri:hasTypeOfUse copri:read.
?actor copri:aims ?goal2.
FILTER NOT EXISTS {?actor copri:hasPermission ?perm.
?perm copri:hasPermissionType copri:permRead}}
CQ17.Which is the personal information that is transferred relying on non-
confidential provision?
SELECT ?PerInfo
WHERE {?PerInfo copri:related ?Actor.
?Prov copri:provisionOf ?PerInfo.
?Prov copri:hasProvisionType copri:nonConfidentialProv}
CQ18.Which is the personal information that is used by a goal, where their
usage (NtU ) are not strictly required (i.e., optional)?
SELECT ?PerInfo
WHERE {?use copri:useOf ?PerInfo.
?use copri:hasNeedtoUseType copri:optional}
CQ19.Which is the personal information that is used by goals, where their
purpose of use (PoU ) is incompatible with the best interest of its owner?
SELECT ?PerInfo
WHERE {?use copri:useOf ?PerInfo.
?use copri:hasPurposeOfUseType copri:incompatible}
CQ20.Which is the personal information that is not anonymized?
SELECT ?PerInfo
WHERE {?PerInfo copri:related ?Actor.
FILTER NOT EXISTS {copri:PC1 Anonymize copri:appliedTo
?PerInfo.}}
CQ21.Which is the personal information that can be linked back to their own-
ers?
SELECT ?PerInfo
WHERE {?PerInfo copri:related ?Actor.
FILTER NOT EXISTS {copri:PC2 Unlinkability copri:appliedTo.
?PerInfo}}
CQ22.Which is the personal information that describes a goal, and it is also
being collected by some actor?
SELECT ?PerInfo
WHERE {?PerInfo copri:related ?Actor.
?PerInfo copri:describes ?goal1.
?use copri:useOf ?PerInfo.
?goal2 copri:useBy ?use.
?use copri:hasTypeOfUse copri:collect}
CQ23.Who are the actors that are collecting personal information without
collect permissions? (returns information too) ?
SELECT ?actor ?PerInfo
WHERE {?PerInfo copri:related ?actor1.
?PerInfo copri:describes ?goal1.
?use copri:useOf ?PerInfo.
?goal2 copri:useBy ?use.
?use copri:hasTypeOfUse copri:collect.
?actor copri:aims ?goal2.
FILTER NOT EXISTS {?actor copri:hasPermission ?perm.
?perm copri:hasPermissionType copri:permCollect}}
CQ24.Who are the actors that do not play any role or they are playing a threat
actor role?
SELECT ?actor
WHERE {{?actor rdf:type/rdfs:subClassOf* copri:Agent.
FILTER NOT EXISTS {?actor copri:plays ?role.}}
UNION {?actor copri:intends ?InThreat.}}
CQ25.Who are the actors that are using (producing, reading, modifying, or col-
lecting) personal information without the required permission? (returns
information too) ?
SELECT ?actor ?PerInfo
WHERE {?PerInfo copri:related ?actor1.
?PerInfo copri:describes ?goal1.
?use copri:useOf ?PerInfo.
?goal2 copri:useBy ?use.
?use copri:hasTypeOfUse copri:produce
[read | modify | collect]
?actor copri:aims ?goal2.
FILTER NOT EXISTS {?actor copri:hasPermission ?perm.
?perm copri:hasPermissionType copri:permProduce
[:permRead | :permModify | :permCollect]}}
CQ26.Who are the delegatees that have not adopted their delegatum?
SELECT ?actor
WHERE{{?actor rdf:type/rdfs:subClassOf* copri:Agent.
FILTER NOT EXISTS{?actor copri:plays ?role.}}
UNION{?actor copri:intends ?InThreat}}
CQ4-13 are used to query risk related aspects, where CQ4 can be used to
return all vulnerabilities as well as the personal information that is subject to
them. For example, CQ4 will return “V1. Weak masking technique” and “I1.
Jack’s glucose level” if applied to the AAL example (Figure 5). CQ5 can be used
to return vulnerabilities as well as threats that can exploit such vulnerabilities.
Concerning the AAL example, it will return “V1.” and both “T1. Linking info to
Jack SL[M]” and “T2. Linking info to Jack SL[M] PL[L]”. CQ6 can be used to
return unmitigated vulnerabilities. In the AAL example, only one unmitigated
vulnerability will be returned (e.g., “V1.”).CQ7 can be used to return any threat
that is threatening personal information as well as the threatened information.
This CQ will return both “T1.”, “T2.” and “I1.” if applied to the AAL example.
CQ8 can be used to return different sets of threats based on their severity
levels (e.g., Low, Medium, or High). If CQ8 has been applied to return threats
with medium severity levels, both “T1.” and “T2.” will be returned. Otherwise,
it will return nothing, i.e., no threats with Low nor High severity level exist
in the AAL example. CQ9 can be used to return intentional threats as well
as the personal information threatened by them. For example, CQ9 will return
“T1.” and “I1.” as “T1.” is the only intentional threat in the example. CQ10
can be used to return threat actors and the intentional threats they intend for,
applying CQ10 to our example, will return “Bob” and “T1.” since “Bob” is the
only threat actor in our example.
CQ11 can be used to return attack methods and the intentional threats they
are used for. For instance, CQ11 will return “AM1. De-masking technique” and
“T1.” if applied to the AAL example. CQ12 can be used to return incidental
threats and personal information that are threatened by them, and it will return
“T2.” and “I1.” if applied to the AAL example. CQ13 can be used to return
different sets of incidental threats based on their probability levels (e.g., Low,
Medium, or High). If CQ13 has been applied to return incidental threats with
a Low probability level, “T2.” will be returned. Otherwise, it will return noth-
ing since no incidental threats with medium nor high probability exists in the
example.
CQ14-15 are used to query treatment-related aspects, where CQ14 can
be used to return privacy goals that have been realized by privacy constraints.
Applying CQ14 to our example will return two privacy goals “PG1. Ensure
anonymity” and “PG2. Ensure unlinkability”. CQ15 can be used to return pri-
vacy mechanisms as well as the personal information such mechanisms are ap-
plied to. Applying CQ15 to the example will return both “PC1. Anonymization
mechanism” and “PC2. Unlinkability mechanism” privacy mechanisms as well
as “I1.”
CQ16-26 are used to query privacy requirements related violations, where
the definitions of the seven main privacy requirements violations are presented
in Table 3. In particular, CQ16-19 are used for analyzing Confidentiality, where
CQ16-17 are used for analyzing non-disclosure by detecting and reporting when
personal information is read without the owner’s permission (CQ16 ), or it has
been transferred relying on non-confidential transmission mean (CQ17 ). For ex-
ample, if Sarah did not have a read permission concerning “Jack’s glucose level”,
CQ16 will detect and report such situation. While if “Jack’s health situation”
Table 3: Definitions of privacy requirements violations
Pri. req. Privacy requirement violation definition
Confidentiality Disclosure, personal information is disclosed without the owner’s
consent (permission), personal information is used for tasks,
where it is not strictly required, and/or personal information is
used for tasks that are incompatible with the specific, explicit,
legitimate purposes, which has been permitted to be used for.
Anonymity Identifiability, the identity of information owner can be suffi-
ciently identified, i.e., it can be disclosed.
Unlinkability Linkability, the link between personal information and its owner
can be sufficiently distinguished, i.e., it is possible to like per-
sonal information back to its owner.
Unobservability Observability, the identity of information owner can be ob-
served/detected by others while performing an activity.
Notice Unnotified, personal information is being collected without no-
tifying its owner.
Transparent Untransparent, information owner is not able to know who is
using his/her information and for what purposes.
Accountable Unaccountable, information owner cannot hold information users
accountable for their actions concerning its personal informa-
tion.
(personal information) is transferred to Mike relying on the non-confidential
provision, CQ17 will detect and report such violation.
CQ18 is used for analyzing Need to Know (NtK) principle by verifying
whether personal information is strictly required by goals using them. For ex-
ample, if the Need to Use (NtU) of the goal “Assess Jack’s situation” concerning
“Jack’s vital signs” is optional, CQ18 will detect and report that such informa-
tion is not strictly required by the goal.
CQ19 is used for analyzing the Purpose of Use (PoU) principle by verifying
whether personal information is used for specific, explicit, legitimate purposes
that have been permitted to be used for. For instance, if the PoU of the goal
“Assess Jack’s situation” concerning “Jack’s vital signs” is incompatible, CQ19
will detect and report that the PoU of such information is incompatible for
specific, explicit, legitimate purposes that have been permitted to be used for.
CQ20 is used for analyzing anonymity by verifying whether the identity
of the information owner can be sufficiently identified. For example, if “Jack’s
glucose level” has not been anonymized relying on “PC1. Anonymization mech-
anism”, CQ20 will detect and report that “Jack’s glucose level” can be used to
sufficiently identify the identity of Jack.
CQ21 is used for analyzing Unlinkability by verifying whether it is possible to
link personal information back to its owner. For example, if “PC2. Unlinkability
mechanism” was not applied to “Jack’s glucose level”, CQ21 will detect and
report that it is possible to link “Jack’s glucose level” to Jack.
CQ22 is used for analyzing unobservability by verifying whether the iden-
tity of the information owner can be observed by others while performing some
activity. Consider that Jack does not want his activities to be monitored while
he is in the bathroom. Then “Jack’s location” should not be collected when he is
in the bathroom, since such information can be used to describe activities per-
formed by Jack, which he does not want it to be observed by others. If “Jack’s
location” is collected, CQ22 will be able to detect and report that.
CQ23 is used for analyzing notice by verifying whether personal informa-
tion is being collected without notifying its owner. We consider that providing
permission to collect implies that the actor has been already notified and agreed
upon the collection of its personal information. In case, personal information
is being collected and there is no permission to collect, CQ23 will detect and
report such violation.
CQ24-C25 are used for analyzing transparency, where CQ24 analyze the
authentication principle and CQ25 analyze the authorization principle. In par-
ticular, CQ24 verifies whether an actor can be authenticated by checking if it is
playing at least one role that enables for identifying its main responsibilities10,
and the actor is not playing any threat actor role. Accordingly, CQ24 will be
able to detect and report whether such actor can be authenticated. Considering
our example, Bob is playing a threat actor role, and it will be returned if CQ24
was applied. While CQ25 analyze authorization by verifying that actors are
not using personal information without the required permissions. In case, Sarah
was reading/collecting any of Jack’ personal information without read/collect
permission, CQ25 will be able to detect and report such violation.
Finally, CQ26 is used for analyzing accountability relying on the non-
repudiation principle by verifying that actors cannot repudiate that they ac-
cepted delegations, which can be done depending on the adoption concept, if
there exists a delegatee without an adopt relationship to the delegatum, CQ26
will detect and report such violation. Concerning our example, if Sarah did not
adopt the read and collect permissions that have been delegated by Jack, CQ26
will detect and report such violations.
7 Evaluation
Evaluation aims to provide evidence that artifact achieves the purpose for which
it has been developed [45,75,99,39]. We evaluate the COPri ontology against the
common pitfalls in ontologies identified in [73]11. These pitfalls can be classified
by criteria under 1- Consistency verifies whether the ontology includes or allows
for any inconsistencies; 2- Completeness verifies whether the domain of interest is
appropriately covered; and 3- Conciseness verifies whether the ontology includes
irrelevant elements or redundant representations of some elements with respect
to the domain to be covered. The pitfalls classification by criteria is shown in
10 If an actor is not playing any role, it will be impossible to authenticate it
11 The catalog of the pitfalls can be found in Appendix A
Table 4: Pitfalls classification by criteria and how they were evaluated
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P1. Creating polysemous elements - - X -
P5. Defining wrong inverse relationships - X - -
P6. Including cycles in the hierarchy X X - -
P7. Merging different concepts in the same class - X X -
P14. Misusing “allValuesFrom” X - - -
P15. Misusing “not some” and “some not” X - - -
P18. Specifying too much the domain or the range X - - -
P19. Swapping intersection and union - X - -
P24. Using recursive definition - X X -
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ss
P4. Creating unconnected ontology elements X X - -
P9. Missing basic information - - - X
P10. Missing disjointness X X - -
P11. Missing domain or range in properties X X - -
P12. Missing equivalent properties - X - -
P13. Missing inverse relationships - X - -
P16. Misusing primitive and defined classes X - - -
C
o
n
c
is
e
n
e
ss P2. Creating synonyms as classes - X X -
P3. Creating the relationship “is” instead of using “subclassOf”, “in-
stanceOf” or “sameIndividual”
- X - -
P17. Specializing too much a hierarchy X - X -
P21. Using a miscellaneous class X X X -
Table 4, where we can also identify the four different methods we followed to
evaluate the COPri ontology against each of the pitfalls:
1- Prote´ge´ & HermiT Reasoner12: HermiT is the first publicly available
OWL reasoner, and it can perform various automated checks such as consistency,
satisfiability, etc. of OWL-based ontologies. Both Prote´ge´ & HermiT have been
used to verify COPri against several pitfalls. In particular, HermiT is able to
detect cycles in the hierarchy (P6.), and P4. has been verified depending on
OntoGraf plug-in that enables to visualize the ontology. Concerning P10., we
have already made all primitive siblings classes in our ontology disjoint, i.e.,
no missing disjoint can be found in the ontology. We have manually checked
whether the domain and range of all object properties have been defined (P11.).
Moreover, we verified P14. depending on Probe Classes [49], which can be used
to test and ensure that the ontology does not include inconsistencies.
COPri ontology cannot suffer from P15. since we did not use complement
operators to describe/define any of the classes. All defined classes have been
defined depending on both necessary and sufficient conditions, which makes the
inferred hierarchy exactly the same as the asserted one. The concepts of the
12 http://www.hermit-reasoner.com/
ontology are general enough to avoid both P17. and P18., i.e., specializing too
much hierarchy (P17.), or specifying the domain and/or the range too much
(P18.). Additionally, when we need very specific concepts (e.g., attribute of a
class), we have used individuals. No miscellaneous class have been identified
(P21.), since the names of all classes and their sub-classes have been carefully
chosen.
2- Evaluation with OntOlogy Pitfall Scanner (OOPS!): OOPS! is a web-
based ontology evaluation tool13 for detecting common pitfalls in ontologies [38].
The ontology can be uploaded to OOPS!, which return an evaluation report
about the detected pitfalls, where each pitfall is described by its identifier, title,
description, elements affected (e.g., classes, object properties, or even the whole
ontology) and an importance level. There are three importance levels based on
the impact that a pitfall may have on the ontology: 1- Critical: it is crucial to
correct the pitfall. Otherwise, the consistency, reasoning, applicability, etc. of
the ontology could be affected; 2- Important: it is not critical for functionality
of the ontology, but it is important to be corrected; and 3- Minor: it does not
represent a problem, but correcting it makes the ontology better organized and
user friendly.
Result of evaluation: the COPri ontology was uploaded to the OOPS! pitfall
scanner, which returned an evaluation report that is shown in Figure 614. In par-
ticular, two suggestions (Figure 7) have been returned, proposing that it might
be better to characterize both of is a and partOf relationships as symmetric or
transitive. We took these suggestions into account, characterizing both of these
relationships as transitive. 53 minor pitfalls (P13 : inverse relationships not ex-
plicitly declared) have been identified. However, as mentioned earlier we used
only one inverse property to minimize the number of properties/relationships in
the ontology.
Finally, only one critical pitfall has been identified shown in Figure 8, and
looking closely at this pitfall, we can see that the reseanor identify that we
are using is a relationship instead of using OWL primitives for representing
the subclass relationship (rdfs:subClassOf). However, is a relationship is used
in most of Goal-based modeling languages, where we have adopted many of the
concepts/relationships of the COPri ontology. Therefore, we chose not to replace
it with the subClassOf relationship. The result of the second test after addressing
one of the suggestions is shown in Figure 9.
3- Lexical semantics experts: two lexical semantics experts with main focus
on Natural Language Processing (NLP) have been provided with the COPri
ontology and they were asked to check whether the ontology suffers from any of
the following pitfalls: P1. Creating polysemous elements, P2. Creating synonyms
as classes, P7. Merging different concepts in the same class, P17. Specializing
too much a hierarchy, P21. Using a miscellaneous class, and P24. Using recursive
definition.
13 http://oops.linkeddata.es/index.jsp
14 Evaluation with OOPS! has been performed after evaluating the ontology with
Prote´ge´ & HermiT, i.e., several pitfalls have been already detected and corrected
Fig. 6: OOPS! evaluation result
Fig. 7: Snapshot of the suggestions
Fig. 8: Snapshot of the identified critical pitfall
Fig. 9: OOPS! final evaluation result
Result of evaluation: several issues have been raised by the experts mainly
concerning P2. Creating synonyms as classes, and P24. Using recursive defini-
tion. Most of these issues has been properly addressed. The experts’ feedback
and how it was addressed can be found in Appendix B.
4- A survey with researchers: the main purpose of this survey was evaluating
the adequacy and completeness of the COPri ontology in terms of its concepts
and relationships for dealing with privacy requirements in their social an organi-
zational context (P9.), i.e., whether the selected concepts and relationships are
adequate to deal with privacy requirements or they need to be refined or ex-
tended. The survey was closed, i.e., it was accessible through a special link that
is provided to the invited participants only to avoid unintended participants. In
what follows, we describe the survey participants, the survey template design,
and the result of the survey:
Survey participants: in total 25 potential participants were contacted to com-
plete the survey, and they were asked to forward the email to anyone who fits in
the participating criteria (e.g., has good experience in privacy and/or security).
We have received 16 responses (64% response rate).
Survey template design: the survey template15, and it is composed of four
main sections: S1. General information about the survey includes a description
of the purpose of the survey, privacy and confidentiality statement, and informed
consent to be read and accepted (checked) by participants before providing any
input. S2. Participant demographic includes four questions related to the partic-
ipant’s name, occupation, type of experience (academic and/or industry), and
years of experience with privacy and/or security. S3. Evaluating the COPri on-
tology aims at collecting feedback from participates for evaluating the adequacy
and completeness of the COPri ontology in terms of its main concepts and
relationships categories and dimensions. S4. Final remarks ] aims at collecting
suggestion and/or criticism concerning the COPri ontology.
S2. Result of demographic questions. 15 (93.8%) of the participants are
researchers (e.g., Professors, Post-docs, and PhD. candidates) and 1 (6.2%) is a
student (e.g., MSc, bachelor). Concerning experience with privacy and/or secu-
rity: 2 (12.5%) of the participants have both academic and industrial experience,
and 14 (87.5%) have pure academic experience. Moreover, 3 (18.8%) have less
than one year, 7 (43.8%) have between one and four years, and 6 (37.5%) have
more than four years of experience.
S.3 Result of evaluation questions. This section is composed of 10 subsec-
tions, each of them is dedicated to collect feedback concerning the adequacy and
completeness of a specific dimension/category of concepts and relationships. In
each of these subsections, we provide the definitions of the concepts and rela-
tionships of the targeted dimension/category as well as a diagram representing
them. Followed by a mandatory question, asking the participant to grade the
completeness of the presented concepts and relationships with respect to the
system aspects they aim to capture on a scale from 1 (incomplete) to 5 (incom-
plete).
In total, we have defined 10 questions each of them for a category or a di-
mension under evaluation. In particular, Q1-7 cover the seven main categories
of concepts in the organizational dimension as follows: Q1 for the agentive en-
tities category, Q2 for the intentional entities category, Q3 for the information
entities category, Q4 for the goals & information interrelationships category, Q5
for the information ownership & permissions category, Q6 for the entities in-
teractions category, and Q7 for the entities social trust category. Moreover, we
defined Q8 for the risk dimension, Q9 for the treatment dimension, and Q10 for
the privacy dimension. The result of the evaluation for each of these sections
is summarized in Table 5. The result tends to demonstrate that most of the
targeted dimension/category of concepts and relationships are properly covering
the aspects they aim to represent.
Additionally, we have added an optional question in each of 10 sections to
evaluate the adequacy of the concepts and relationships by collecting suggestions
to improve the category/dimension under evaluation. Some feedback suggested
to refine, include or exclude some of the concepts/relationships, we took some
of these suggestions into account while developing the final ontology.
15 The survey template can be found at https://goo.gl/bro8nG
Table 5: The result of the evaluation
Strongly Disagree N. agree/ Agree Strongly
disagree n. disagree agree
Q1. Agentive cat. 0 (%0) 1 (%6.3) 3 (%18.8) 6 (%37.5) 6 (%37.5)
Q2. Intentional cat. 0 (%0) 1 (%6.3) 4 (%25.0) 7 (%43.8) 4 (%25.0)
Q3. Informational cat. 0 (%0) 2 (%12.5) 4 (%25.0) 4 (%25.0) 6 (%37.5)
Q4. Goals & info cat. 0 (%0) 2 (%12.5) 2 (%12.5) 6 (%37.5) 6 (%37.5)
Q5. Ownership cat. 0 (%0) 1 (%6.3) 1 (%6.3) 5 (%31.3) 9 (%56.3)
Q6. Interactions cat. 0 (%0) 1 (%6.3) 1 (%6.3) 6 (%37.5) 8 (%50)
Q7. Social Trust cat. 0 (%0) 0 (%0.0) 4 (%25.0) 7 (%43.8) 5 (%31.3)
Q8. Risk dim. 0 (%0) 3 (%18.8) 0 (%00.0) 8 (%50) 5 (%31.3)
Q9. Treatment dim. 0 (%0) 0 (%0.00) 3 (%18.8) 7 (%43.8) 6 (%37.5)
Q10. Privacy dim. 0 (%0) 2 (%12.5) 2 (%12.5) 5 (%31.3) 7 (%43.8)
Result of the final remarks question: most of the feedback was valu-
able, has raised important issues and ranged from complementing to criticizing.
For example, among the encouraging feedback we received “COPri covers a
wide range of privacy-related concepts, with actor and goal oriented perspectives,
which looks promising. We look forward to seeing it used to capture real-world
privacy problem context”. Another feedback and suggestion was “I think it is
very precise and a very good work. Maybe some others concepts could be ex-
pressed somewhere”. One of the comments we received was “How satisfaction
of privacy requirements can be verified using it?”. We also received criticisms
such as the following one “I have no idea how good it is unless it is applied to
many real cases. I’m concerned that it is not grounded in reality. It’s also very
complicated, which makes it hard to apply in industry”. However, such criticism
opens the way for future research directions.
8 Threats to validity
After presenting and discussing the of our ontology, we list and discuss the
threats to its validity in this section. Following Runeson et al. [81], we classify
the identified threats under two types, internal and external:
1- Internal threats: is concerned with factors that have not been considered
in the study, and they could have influenced the investigated factors [92,81]. We
have identified one threat: Authors’ background,] the authors of this study have
good experience in goal modeling (especially in i* [104] based languages). This
may have influenced the selection and definitions of the concepts and relation-
ships of the ontology. However, i* languages have been developed with the aim
to capture requirements in their social and organizational context, which is also
a main objective of our ontology.
2- External threats: is concerned with to what extent the results of the study
can be generalized [81]. We have identified two threats: 1. Validity of the survey
result, the number of participants can raise concerns about the validity of the
result. However, most of them are experts with good experience in privacy, and
some of them are high-profile researchers. 2. Extensive evaluation, the ontology
has been evaluated against the common pitfalls in ontologies with the help of
some tools, lexical semantics experts, and privacy researchers, yet it has not
been applied in industry, which may reveal undetected errors and new ways to
improve it. However, applying our ontology to real case studies from different
domains is on our list for future work.
9 Related work
Several ontologies have been proposed for dealing with privacy and security.
For example, Oltramari et al. [69] propose PrivOnto, a semantic framework for
the analyzing privacy policies, they also developed an interactive online tool
that allows users to explore 23,000 annotated data practice instantiated in the
PrivOnto knowledge base. Singhal and Wijesekera [85] provide a security ontol-
ogy that can be used to identify which threats endanger which assets and what
countermeasures can be used. Moreover, Massacci et al. [61] propose ontology
for security requirements engineering that adopts concepts from Secure Tropos
methodology [65], and several industrial case studies. While Velasco et al. [98]
introduce an ontology-based framework for representing and reusing security
requirements based on risk analysis. Additionally, Kang and Liang [54] devel-
oped security ontology for software development, which includes most common
security concerns, and Dritsas et al. [17] developed an ontology for designing
and developing a set of security patterns that can be used to deal with security
requirements for e-health applications. General privacy ontologies/taxonomies
(e.g., Anton and Earp [3], Solove et al. [87], and Wuyts et al. [103]) can serve as
a general knowledge repository for a knowledge-based privacy goal refinement.
On the other hand, several approaches for dealing with privacy requirements
have been proposed in the literature. For instance, Spiekermann and Cranor [89]
propose guidelines for building privacy-friendly systems and three-layer model
of user privacy concerns and relate them to system operations in terms of data
transfer, storage, and processing. In addition, they propose guidelines for build-
ing privacy-friendly systems. Moreover, Deng et al. [14] provide a methodology
for modeling privacy-specific threats for software systems along with a catalog of
privacy-specific threat tree patterns, which can be used to address threats identi-
fied during the analysis. Radics et al. [78] introduce the PREprocess, a framework
for privacy requirements engineering, which has been designed to guide a privacy
analyst during the collection and elicitation of privacy requirements through the
identification of privacy-related patterns.
Moreover, Labda et al. [57] propose a privacy-aware Business Processes (BP)
framework for modeling, reasoning and enforcing privacy constraints. The frame-
work offers five concepts that can be used for analyzing privacy-related aspects
such as access control, separation of Tasks (SoT), Binding of Tasks (BoT), user
consent, Necessity to know (NtK), etc. Hong et al. [47] propose a privacy risk
model specifically for ubiquitous computing, which captures privacy concerns at
high abstraction level, and then refining them into concrete specific solutions.
Gharib et al. [36] propose a holistic approach for analyzing privacy requirements
that aim at assisting software engineers in designing privacy-aware systems by
providing guidance and support while dealing with privacy requirements. Finally,
Kalloniatis et al. [52] introduce PriS that is a security requirements engineering
method, which supports eight types of privacy goals corresponding to the eight
privacy concerns they identify in their work, namely: authentication, authoriza-
tion, identification, data protection, anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability, and
unobservability.
10 Conclusions and Future Work
We introduce COPri, a Core Ontology for Privacy requirements engineering that
adopts and extends our previous work, where we proposed a privacy ontology
that has been mined through a systematic literature review. In this paper, we
extend and refine the concepts and relationships proposed in [34], we have also
implemented the ontology depending on Prote´ge´, and applied it to illustrating
example concerning Ambient-Assisted Living systems. Then, we have validated
the ontology by querying the ontology instance (AAL example) depending on
Competency Questions (CQs). This allows evaluating whether the ontology is
able to capture detailed knowledge about the targeted domain to fulfill the needs
of its intended use. Finally, we evaluated the ontology against common pitfalls
in ontologies with the help of some software tools, lexical semantics experts, and
privacy and security researchers.
The main aim of developing COPri is assisting software engineers while de-
signing privacy-aware systems by providing a generic and expressive set of key
privacy concepts and relationships, which enable for capturing privacy require-
ments in their social and organizational context. This work is our second step
towards proposing a well-defined privacy ontology, which when completed would
constitute a great step forward in improving the quality of privacy-aware sys-
tems. However, much work is still to be done.
For future work, we plan to better validate our ontology by deploying it to
capture privacy requirements for real case studies from different domains. More-
over, we will refine and analyze several privacy-related concepts. For example,
we plan to better analyze how the sensitivity level of personal information can
be determined based on the situation, and how sensitivity levels can be used
to facilitate the identification of related privacy requirements. Moreover, we will
refine the analysis of the Need to Use (NtU) property, trying to better charac-
terize the relationship between a goal and personal information. Additionally,
a special attention will be given for refining the analysis of the Purpose of Use
(PoU) property, as Compatible/Compatible are two abstract to characterize such
important property, and we will investigate how the PoU can be determined au-
tomatically based on the characteristics of goal.
On the other hand, we are planning to develop a goal-oriented framework
based on our ontology. This framework will be used for modeling and analyzing
privacy requirements in their social and organizational context. Moreover, it
will provide mechanisms for deriving the final privacy specifications in terms
of privacy policies. This requires achieving two goals, defining privacy policy
specification language and a set of rules for the automated derivation of privacy
policy specifications from the requirements model. Finally, we aim to promote
the adoption of our ontology by providing illustration and documentation as it
is available only as a raw OWL file. This may encourage other researchers to
adopt, use and extend or provide us with useful feedback.
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Appendix A
Catalog of Common Pitfalls In what follows, we present the catalog of 24
pitfalls identified in [73]:
P1. Creating polysemous elements: an ontology element whose name has
different meanings is included in the ontology to represent more than one
conceptual idea.
P2. Creating synonyms as classes: several classes whose identifiers are syn-
onyms are created and defined as equivalent. For example, we could define
“Car”, “Motorcar” and “Automobile” as equivalent classes. This pitfall is
related to the guidelines presented in [41].
P3. Creating the relationship “is” instead of using “subclassOf”, “in-
stanceOf” or “sameIndividual”: the “is” relationship is created in the
ontology instead of using OWL primitives for representing the subclass re-
lationship (“subclassOf”), the membership to a class (“instanceOf”), or the
equality between instances (“sameAs”). This pitfall is also related to the
guidelines for understanding the “is-a” relation provided in [41].
P4. Creating unconnected ontology elements: ontology elements (classes,
relationships or attributes) are created with no relation to the rest of the
ontology. An example of this type of pitfall is to create the relationship
“memberOfTeam” and to miss the class representing teams; thus, the rela-
tionship created is isolated in the ontology.
P5. Defining wrong inverse relationships: two relationships are defined
as inverse relations when actually they are not. For example, something is
sold or something is bought; in this case, the relationships “isSoldIn” and
“isBoughtIn” are not inverse.
P6. Including cycles in the hierarchy [28,41]: a cycle between two classes
in the hierarchy is included in the ontology, although it is not intended to
have such classes as equivalent. That is, some class A has a subclass B and
at the same time B is a subclass of A. An example of this type of pitfall is
represented by the class “Professor” as a subclass of “Person”, and the class
“Person” as a subclass of “Professor”.
P7. Merging different concepts in the same class: a class is created whose
identifier is referring to two or more different concepts. An example of this
type of pitfall is to create the class “StyleAndPeriod”, or “ProductOrSer-
vice”.
P8. Missing annotations: ontology terms lack annotations properties. This
kind of properties improves the ontology understanding and usability from
a user point of view.
P9. Missing basic information: needed information is not included in the
ontology. Sometimes this pitfall is related to the requirements in the Ontol-
ogy Requirements Specification Document (ORSD) [90] that are not covered
by the ontology. Other times it is related to knowledge that could be added
to the ontology in order to make it more complete.
P10. Missing disjointness [41,28,74]: the ontology lacks disjoint axioms be-
tween classes or between properties that should be defined as disjoint. For
example, we can create the classes “Odd” and “Even” (or the classes “Prime”
and “Composite”) without being disjoint; such representation is not correct
based on the definition of these types of numbers.
P11. Missing domain or range in properties: relationships without domain
or range (or none of them) are included in the ontology. There are situations
in which the relation is very general and the range should be the most general
concept “Thing”. This pitfall is related to the common error when defining
ranges and domains described in [74].
P12. Missing equivalent properties: when an ontology is imported into an-
other, classes that are duplicated in both ontologies are normally defined
as equivalent classes. However, the ontology developer misses the definition
of equivalent properties in those cases of duplicated relationships and at-
tributes. For example, the classes “CITY” and “City” in two different ontolo-
gies are defined as equivalent classes; however, relationships “hasMember”
and “has-Member” in two different ontologies are not defined as equivalent
relations.
P13. Missing inverse relationships: there are two relationships in the on-
tology that should be defined as inverse relations. For example, the case in
which the ontology developer omits the inverse definition between the re-
lations “hasLanguageCode” and “isCodeOf”, or between “hasReferee” and
“isRefereeOf”.
P14. Misusing “allValuesFrom” [74]: this pitfall can appear in two different
ways. In the first, the anomaly is to use the universal restriction (“allVal-
uesFrom”) as the default qualifier instead of using the existential restriction
(“someValuesFrom”). This means that the developer thinks that “allValues-
From” implies “someValuesFrom”. In the second, the mistake is to include
“allValuesFrom” to close off the possibility of further additions for a given
property.
P15. Misusing “not some” and “some not” [74]: to mistake the represen-
tation of “some not” for “not some”, or the other way round. An example
of this type of pitfall is to define a vegetarian pizza as any pizza which both
has some topping that is not meat and also has some topping that is not
fish. This example is explained in more detail in [74].
P16. Misusing primitive and defined classes [74]: to fail to make the defi-
nition “complete” rather than “partial” (or “necessary and sufficient” rather
than just “necessary”). It is critical to understand that, in general, nothing
will be inferred to be subsumed under a primitive class by the classifier.
This pitfall implies that the developer does not understand the open world
assumption. A more detailed explanation and examples can be found in [74].
P17. Specializing too much a hierarchy: the hierarchy in the ontology is
specialized in such a way that the final leaves cannot have instances, because
they are actually instances and should have been created in this way instead
of being created as classes. Authors in [41] provide guidelines for distinguish-
ing between a class and an instance when modeling hierarchies. An example
of this type of pitfall is to create the class “RatingOfRestaurants” and the
classes “1fork”, “2forks”, and so on, as subclasses instead of as instances. An-
other example is to create the classes “Madrid”, “Barcelona”, “Sevilla”, and
so on as subclasses of “Place”. This pitfall could be also named “Individuals”
are not Classes.
P18. Specifying too much the domain or the range [41,74]: not to find
a domain or a range that is general enough. An example of this type of
pitfall is to restrict the domain of the relationship “isOfficialLanguage” to
the class “City”, instead of allowing also the class “Country” to have an
official language or a more general concept such as “GeopoliticalObject”.
P19. Swapping intersection and union: the ranges and/or domains of the
properties (relationships and attributes) are defined by intersecting several
classes in cases in which the ranges and/or domains should be the union of
such classes. An example of this type of pitfall is to create the relationship
“takesPlaceIn” with domain “OlympicGames” and with the range the in-
tersection of the classes “City” and “Nation”. This pitfall is related to the
common error appear in [74,41].
P20. Swapping Label and Comment: the contents of the Label and Com-
ment annotation properties are swapped. An example of this type of pitfall
is to include in the Label annotation of the class “Crossroads” the following
sentence “the place of intersection of two or more roads”; and to include in
the Comment annotation the word “Crossroads”.
P21. Using a miscellaneous class: to create in a hierarchy a class that con-
tains the instances that do not belong to the sibling classes instead of clas-
sifying such instances as instances of the class in the upper level of the
hierarchy. This class is normally named “Other” or “Miscellaneous”. An ex-
ample of this type of pitfall is to create the class “HydrographicalResource”,
and the subclasses “Stream”, “Waterfall”, etc., and also the subclass “Oth-
erRiverElement”.
P22. Using different naming criteria in the ontology: no naming conven-
tion is used in the identifiers of the ontology elements. Some notions about
naming conventions are provided in [41]. For example, we can name a class
by starting with upper case, e.g. “Ingredient”, and its subclasses by starting
with lower case, e.g. “animalorigin”, “drink”, etc.
P23. Using incorrectly ontology elements: an ontology element (class, re-
lationship or attribute) is used to model a part of the ontology that should be
modeled with a different element. A particular case of this pitfall regarding
the misuse of classes and property values is addressed in [41]. An example
of this type of pitfall is to create the relationship “isEcological” between an
instance of “Car” and the instance “Yes” or “No”, instead of creating the
attribute “isEcological” whose range is Boolean.
P24. Using recursive definition: an ontology element is used in its own
definition. For example, it is used to create the relationship “hasFork” and
to establish as its range the following the set of restaurants that have at least
one value for the relationship “hasFork”.
Appendix B
The list of the pitfalls identified by experts are shown in Table 6. Each pitfall
is described with its identifier (e.g., P1., P2., P7., P17., P21. or P24.), affected
element(s) (e.g., a class or a relationship), a description of the pitfall, followed
by how we addressed it.
Table 6: Expert’s comments and how they were addressed
ID Affected element Description
P2. “A goal is a state of affairs that an actor
intends (aims) to achieve”.
The term “intends” might be confused
with the term “intends” in the defini-
tion of the threat actor
We have refined the definition of the goal to address this comment as follows:
“A goal is a state of affairs that an actor aims to achieve.”
P24. “Information represents any informa-
tional entity without intentionality.”
Information is used in its own definition
We have refined the definition of Information as follows:
“Information represents a statement provided or learned about something
or someone.”
P2. “We adopt four different sensitivity lev-
els that range from 1 to 4, where 4 is the
most sensitive.”
There is no need to include numerical
levels, such information is already pre-
sented as natural language describing
sensitivity levels.
We have addressed this comment as follows:
“We adopt four different sensitivity levels ordered as (R)estricted, (C)onfidential,
(S)ensitive, and Secre(T), where Secre(T) is the most sensitive.”
P2. “Accordingly, we adopt four cor-
responding categories (we represent
as classes) of personal information,
namely Restricted, Confidential, Sensi-
tive, and Secret.”
Adding Restricted, Confidential, Sensi-
tive, and Secret subclasses of personal
information is not required, such infor-
mation is already captured by the sen-
sitivity levels of personal information.
“We have addressed this comment by removing the four subclasses of personal
information (e.g., Restricted, Confidential, Sensitive, and Secret).”
P24. “Compliant indicates that the pur-
pose for which information is used is
compliant with the rules that guarantee
the best interest of its owner;” (same for
Incompliant)
Compliant/Incompliant are used in
their own definitions
We have performed the following modifications:
“Compatible indicates that the purpose for which information is used is compliant
with the rules that guarantee the best interest of its owner”
“Incompatible indicates that the purpose for which information is used is not
compliant with the rules that guarantee the best interest of its owner”
P24. “Describes is a relationship between
information and goal, where informa-
tion describes the goal while it is pur-
sued by some actor.”
Describes is used in its own definition
We have refined the definition of Describes to address this comment as follows:
“Describes is a relationship between information and a goal, where information
characterizes the goal while it is being pursued by some actor”
P24. “Information provision captures the
provision of (provisionOf) information
..”
provision is used in its own definition
We have addressed this comment as follows:
“Information provision captures the transmission of information ..”
P21. Information, personal and public infor-
mation
Dividing information into public infor-
mation and personal information indi-
cates that a personal information can-
not be public, which is not correct (the
properties public and personal are not
disjoint). I think that the sub classes
should be public information and pri-
vate information
We did not made any changes to address this comment since we believe the
concepts we adopt (e.g., public and personal) are fine, and they are highly
adopted and used by privacy researchers.
